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Summary  findings
Innovations in futures, options, and derivative  They specify optimal production  and inventory
instruments permit active trading, speculating, and  conditions using a third-order  cost function and estimate
hedging - linking markets for physical petroleum  them using monthly observations. Their inventory
products with financial markets. These derivative  arbitrage condition embodies the Hotelling principle and
markets continuously value petroleum delivered today  Kaldor's convenience yield, and includes a premium on
and for future dates, thus providing a market price for  the dispersion in crude oil prices.
inventories.  Underground  petroleum  reserves  are also an  The  empirical  results  suggest that  returns  to storage
inventory defined by exploration surveys and  contain both a cost-reducing component  (consistent with
development drilling. As a result. observable market  Kaldor's original notion of "convenience")  and often
information can be used to value rhese reserves.  sizable premiums associated with the dispersion of
Option-valuation models can be used to price reserves  petroleum prices. Their findings suggest that crude oil
using observable markets, but are dependent on  markets differentiated by quality and location provide
unexplained convenience yields revealed by the term  similar premiums.
structure of futures prices. Considine and Larson apply a  The premiums associated with the dispersion of
general model of inventory pricing to petroleum  petroleum prices may account for persistent
inventories and generate an empirical model of the  backwardation in crude oil prices. This finding may also
returns to storage for petroleum  markets. They examine  explain the wide discrepancies between Hotelling values
the determinants of the convenience Yield  for crude oil  and transaction prices found in previous studies.
using a stochastic control  model.
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Innovations  in futures,  options,  and derivative  instruments  permnit  active  trading,  speculating,  and
hedging  linking  markets  for physical  petroleum  products  with financial  markets. These  derivative  markets
continuously  value petroleum  delivered  today  and for future  dates,  thereby  providing  a market  price  for
inventories.  Underground  petroleum  reserves  are  also an inventory  defined  by exploration  surveys  and
development  drilling. As a result,  observable  market  information  can be used  to value  these  reserves.
Option-valuation  models  can be used  to price  reserves  using  observable  markets,  but are  dependent
upon unexplained  convenience  yields  revealed  by the term structure  of futures  prices. This paper  applies  a
general  model  of inventory  pricing  to petroleum  inventories  and generates  an empirical  model  of the returns
to storage  for petroleum  markets. The results  suggest  that the returns  contain  both a cost-reducing
component  consistent  with Kaldor'  s original  notion  of "convenience"  as well as a frequently  sizeable
premium  associated  with the dispersion  of petroleum  prices. Further,  our findings  suggest  that crude  oil
markets  differentiated  by quality  and location  provide  similar  premia.
The valuation  of crude  oil reserves  raises a number  analytical  issues,  which  we identify  and explore
in the following  section. To set the stage  for our empirical  analysis,  we then provide  an overview  of crude
oil  markets. Our  empirical  results  appear  in section  five after  presentation  of the empirical  model. The
paper  concludes  with  a summary  of our main  findings  and suggestions  for further  research.
HI.  Valuation of Crude Oil Reserves
Hotelling  (1931)  proposed  that the equilibrium  rate  of return  on an exhaustible  natural  resource
will  rise at the rate of interest. The logic is that in equilibrium  the producer  is indifferent  between  holding  a
barrel  of oil in reserve  and producing  one barrel  now when  the rate of appreciation  on the reserve  is just
equal  to the rate of return  from pumping  now  and investing  the proceeds.
There  have  been several  empirical  studies  to test the validity  of the Hotelling  Principle. Time series
studies  by Heal  and Barrow  (1980)  and Srnith  (1981)  generally  have not been supportive  although  the tests
and data have  serious  difficulties.  Miller  and Upton  (1985a)  test a related  relation,  called  the Hotelling
Valuation  Principle  (HVP),  in which  the value  of mineral  reserves  depends  upon  prices  net of extraction
costs. They  find that the Hotelling  values  account  for a significant  portion  of the variation  in market  values
but in a later study  Miller  and Upton (1985b)  find less support  for the HVP.
Adelman  (1990)  argues  that the valuation  principle  is not useful  because  it implies  unrealistically
high depletion  rates. Moreover,  Adelman  (1990)  asserts  that there  is really no fixed  economic stock  of
petroleum  resources,  only  flows into  a reserve  inventory.  Later, Adelman  and Watkins  (1995)  use actual
transactions  prices  for oil and gas properties  and find that their  estimates  of reserve  values  are less than half2
those suggested  by the HVP. These  results  support  Adelman's  (1990)  previous  suggestion  that such a
discrepancy  might  arise  because  the buyer  is paying  for the option  to more  intensively  develop  a known  oil
pool sometime  in the future.
An alternative  approach  to pricing  petroleum  assets  has its roots  in the literature  on the cost of
storage. Kaldor  (1939),  Working  (1934),  Brennan  (1958)  and Telser (1958)  argue  that inventory  holding
is profitable  even  during  price backwardation  due to a convenience  yield that offsets  the negative  returns
from storage. Starting  with Kaldor,  a number  of authors  attributed  the convenience  yield  to cost-reducing
features  of inventory  holding. However,  more  recently,  the  discussion  on the value  of inventories  has
emphasized  other  attributes. Lovell  (1961)  suggested  that inventories  serve  to smooth  production.  This
notion  has been  tested  empirically  with  mixed  results  by Blinder  (1982, 1986),  Fair (1989),  Krane  and
Braun (1991),  and Blinder  and Maccini  (1991). Williams  and Wright  (1990)  emphasize  the returns to
storage  due to potential  stockouts  and Considine  (1991)  and Pindyck  (1994)  stress  the non-linear
relationship  between  production  and storage  costs.
Brennan  and Schwartz  (1985)  and later Gibson  and Schwartz  (1990)  sought  to derive  the market
price  for pricing  petroleum  assets  based  on the observable  term structure  of petroleum  futures  markets.
Although  motivated  by the time series  properties  of the forward  convenience  yield  of crude  oil (Gibson  and
Schwartz,  1989),  Gibson  and Schwartz  (1990)  developed  an empirical  model  of pricing  assets  which
explicitly  modeled  a risk-premium  based on stochastic  price  movements.  Later,  Larson  (1993)  provided  a
stochastic  model  and derived  a price  arbitrage  equation  from first principals  to explain  the negative  retums
to storage  for refined  copper.
In this paper,  we stress  that measures  of the convenience  yield contain  two separate  components.
First,  inventories  may be cost-saving  in the tradition  of Kaldor. Second,  the value  of inventories  embodies
a premium  related  to the stochastic  nature  of prices,  similar  to the value  of an option. The value  of this
premium  can be derived  from  observed  market  information.  We  conclude  that,  on average,  40% of the
value  of US petroleum  inventories  can be attributed  to the volatile  nature  of petroleum  prices. The  premia
are also substantial  for UK Brent-38b  and Dubai  Fateh  Prompt  crude  oil and smaller  for Malaysia  Tapis
and Indonesia  Minas-34  crudes.3
III. Crude  Oil Markets
Once crude  oil is extracted  from the earth,  it is collected  by pipelines  at the oil  field and then
shipped  either by pipeline  or tanker  to refineries  where  it is refined  into  an array  of petroleum  products,
including  gasoline,  distillate  fuel,  residual  fuel  oil,  jet fuel,  and petrochemical  products. Despite  the
perceived  dominance  of the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (0. P. E. C.), many  countries
around  the world  now  produce  crude  oil. The United  States  is the most mature  producing  area  with
extensive  trading  in crude  oil futures  and options. Many  developing  countries,  such as Columbia,  Mexico,
and Malaysia,  have  become  significant  crude  oil producers  in recent  years.
Inventories  of crude  are held  at various  points  in the petroleum  distribution  network. A small
amount  is held  by oil lease  holders  at the oil field. The largest  stocks,  nearly  two-thirds  of total  private
stocks  in the U. S., are in pipelines  and tank farms. The  remaining  third of private stocks  are held  at
petroleum  refineries. In the U. S. almost  50 percent  of total stocks  are held  by the federal  government  in
the strategic  petroleum  reserve. In this study,  we ignore  these stocks  because  they do not vary with market
conditions. Moreover,  we examine  total private  stocks  because  Blanchard  (1983)  shows  that basic
arbitrage  relations  are unaffected  by aggregation  over the  distribution  chain.  We measure  stocks  and flows
in physical  units unadjusted  for seasonal  variation,  which  avoids  the measurement  errors  identified  by Fair
(1989).
Although  extensive  price  data  exist  for several  regions  around  the world,  monthly  inventory  and
production  data for developing  countries  is much  more  difficult  to obtain. As a result,  we confine  our
initial  investigation  of the determinants  of the convenience  yield for crude  oil to the United  States. We  then
use  these results  to estimate  dispersion  premium  for other  crudes  traded  around  the world.
Crude oil production  in the United  States  averages  7.36 mnillion  barrels  per day (see  Table 1).
Total  private  crude  oil inventories  are on average  about  340  million  barrels  with a standard  deviation  of
fourteen  million  barrels. Variability  in domestic  production  is slightly  less than  the variability  in domestic
crude  oil sales,  which  may  reflect  production  smoothing.
Spot prices  for West  Texas  Intermediate  (WTI)  and several  other  major crudes  appear  in Table 1.
Forward  contracts  are  actively  traded  in oil so we use the four week  forward  price in computing
convenience  yields.' The convenience  yields  are  identical  reflecting  highly  integrated  global  markets.
Time series  plots for crude  oil prices  and inventories  appear  in the following  two figures. Both
plots reveal  no clear trend  in prices  and inventories  over this period. However,  both display  sharp swings
' As Pindyck  (1994)  notes,  unlike  forward  contracts,  futures  require  a settlement  and transfer  of funds  at the  close
of each  trading  day. As a result,  oil futures  prices  exceed  forward  prices  if the  risk  free  interest  rate  is stochastic
and  positively  correlated  with  spot  crude  oil  prices.4
before  and after  August 1990,  when  the Persian Gulf  crisis started. Before  the crisis,  spot crude  prices
were falling  and inventories  were  increasing. Spot  sales were selling  at a deep  discount  relative  to forward
sales so it was cheap  to hold inventories.  With the onset  of the crisis, spot  prices  shot above  forward
prices,  holding  inventories  became  very  expensive  and, as a result,  stock levels  declined  sharply  (see
Figures 1 & 2). Also  during  this period,  implied  volatility  on crude  oil options  increased  sharply  as Figure
3 illustrates.
The relationship  between  storage  levels  and the forward  price  spread  is illustrated  in Figure  4.
Here we see that large  negative  spreads  occur  when  the market  is in backwardation  with spot prices
exceeding  the forward  prices.  These  negative  returns  occur  at relatively  low stock levels. In contrast,  large
positive  forward  spreads  occur  with high inventory  levels,  which depress  spot prices. The scatter  diagram
also reveals  that the crude  oil market  is often  in price backwardation.
Table 1: Summary  Statistics  for Petroleum  Markets,  1988  to 19942
.Rtand.Rrd
Mean  Deviation
U. S. Crude  Oil  (Millions  of Barrels)
Dailv  Production  7.36  0.45
Daily  Sales  7.37  0.52
Endina  Stocks  341.00  14.17
Snot Prices  (Dollars  Der  Barrel)
West Texas Intermnediate  Crude  19.77  3.75
Malavsia TaDis  19.61  4.26
Dubai Fateh PromDt  16.16  3.64
UK Brent-38 b  18.63  4.19
Indonesia Minas-34  18.48  4.09
Four Week Forward Prices
West Texas Intermediate Crude  19.63  3.56
Dubai Fateh  16.02  3.39
UK Brent-38 b  18.47  3.90
Convenience Yields*  (Percent)
West Texas Intermediate Crude  5.96  2.24
Dubai Fateh  5.96  2.31
UK Brent-38 b  5.96  2.27
2 These yields are computed  as yield,  = r+12[1n(Pj,, 1)-ln(Pf,)]  where r is the yild on a one-month  certificate  of
deposit  at an annual rate and Pj,  is the spot price of oil and Pi,., is the forward  price.5
IV. Empirical  Model
In this section,  the formal  model  is presented 3. A generalized  price-arbitrage  condition  is derived
from  the first-order  conditions  of the optimization  problem  which  is consistent  with inventory-holding
during  an anticipated  price  fall. The problem  is characterized  as a continuous  two-cycle  problem  with
uncertain  future  demand.  In the current  period,  the producer  knows  the current  sales price. By deciding
how  much  to produce  and sell,  he determines  how much  inventory  he will  bring into  the next  period. The
expected  marginal  value,  or the shadow  price,  of the inventory  in the next  period  is not known,  but contains
a stochastic  element  since  demand  is uncertain.  The effects  of random  demand  shocks  on the shadow  price
of inventories  may  be asymmetric  -- that is, a positive  random  shock  may  increase  prices  by more  than an
equally  sized  negative  random  shock. In such  a case,  the shadow  price  of inventory  will  carry  a dispersion
premium  so that the shadow  price  of inventories  increases  with the variance  of the stochastic  component  of
sales. Such  a premium  is analogous  to the volatility  premium  in an options  price  and can result  in positive
inventory  levels  even  when  price  declines  are  expected.
When sales contain a random element, inventory  levels will also be stochastic and changes in
inventories  will contain  a planned  and unplanned  component. The difference  between  planned  and actual
inventories  will be the difference  between  expected  and actual production  minus sales. For the moment,
assume  that the change  in inventories  can be expressed  as the following  process:
-x,  -Et  l [xt -x,=£  =x, -x,-l  -Et  l [Y,  -st]  (1)
where £  has an expected  value of zero and a variance a 2 . Rewriting  the constraint on inventories  in
continuous-time  notation,  the value of ending  inventories  at time t,  is the solution  to the following  infinite-
horizon  problem:
e'nt V(x,,)=Maxsr  EJ{[psT-C(y,x)]e  (f~I)}dt,s.t.dx=E(y-s)dt+cdv.  (2)
ti
The term dv  u(t)dte 2 is a Wiener process, where u(t) -N(O,  1).  Because  inventory  changes include  a
random  component,  dx/dt  does  not exist  in the usual sense  and the rules  of stochastic  calculus  apply.
Evaluated at t, , the solution to (2) gives the value of ending stocks, that is, J(x,, tr)  = V(x,)  e"',  . In the
language  of optimal  control theory,  the firm's problem  is a stochastic  infinite-horizon  problem,  stretching
from t, onwards. As a result, the shadow  price for the end-of-period  inventories  in the first stage of the
' For  a more  detailed  description  of the  model  derivation,  see Larson  (1993).producer problem is based on expectations of an on-going process of production amid uncertain demand.
Generally, the  solution for  J(x.,ti)  can be  found by  solving Bellman's equation, a  partial  differential
equation:  -aJ(xi, t,) /at  =  rV(xd)e  e-  . Arbitrarily  setting  t, = 0  simplifies  the equation  somewhat  so that  the
solution to the inventory problem from  t,  onward can be represented by the Hamilton-Jacobi equation of
dynamic programming:
rV(X,)  =  MaxSE[p  -C (y,  )]+V(Y-)  + I Va 2 (3)
The first-order conditions for the maximization of (3) are:
i) E(p - VJ  =  (4)
ii)E(-Cy  - Vx)=o
iii)  E (dx) = E (y - s) dt
iv)x(t,  = O)=xl
The producer solves for planned production, sales and inventories by setting expected marginal costs
equal to expected price equal to the shadow price of inventories, v,  -- which is itself an expected value.
It is worth noting that the distribution of the error term, especially a  2,  is independent of the decision
variables.  The variance of the error is regarded as a state of nature and is not subject to choice on the part
of the producer.  This assumption is implicit throughout the paper and works well empirically.
Several additional assumptions must be made to guarantee that the first-order conditions do indeed
provide a  maximum.  V  must be concave in  x; the  solution values of  x, y,  and  s must be  positive 4
(otherwise border solutions must be considered); and the transversality-at-infinity  condition must hold. 5
4For  the empirical  problem  at hand, refiner inventories  of refined copper are all positive  as are quantities  sold
and produced. Inventories  at both the COMEX  and LME have remained  positive throughout  the history of those
institutions  as well. However,  to be complete,  stock-outs  need to be considered  in the theoretical  model and non-
negativity  constraints  introduced  to the maximization  problem. These are given in Annex 2.
'For the infinite-horizon  autonomous  problem  given  above, the transversality  condition  is:
lim V (t)Z() e`(-to)  = lim J.(t)z(t)e-r  = 0.
Benveniste  and Scheinkman  (1982) showed  that the condition  is necessary  and sufficient  for the solution  of Al.6
to be optimal. The logic is that any positive stock level must have no value as the problem  approaches  infinity.
Otherwise,  the firm could further increase profits by either producing less or selling more in the last period.
Inventories  have value because,  ultimately,  they can be sold. If some price exists at which no copper can be sold,
then some upper bound  must exist for the shadow  price of inventories.  If so and if stock levels, x, are limited by
physical  storage or natural  endowments,  then discounting  will assure  that the transversality  condition  holds. See
Brock  (1987) for further  details  on the general  condition.7
An expression  for the marginal  value of inventories  is found by applying  the envelope  theory  (Dixit,
1990)  to the Hamilton-Jacobi  equation  given  in (3):
rV, = E[-q,  + V,=  (y - s) +-  Y,  Vc2  ](5
~~~~~~~~~~~  (5)
At the solution, E[p]  = VI, (as part of the first-order conditions in (4) so that:
E[dp / dt]=  Vu  E[dx  / dt]  (6)
Rewriting part iii of (4) provides Eldx /dtJ = Ely -s] . These results can be combined to form a price-
arbitrage  condition. First, from rearranging  (6) and using  iii from (4):
V  E[y-s]=V  E[dx/dt]=rV  +4E[C  ]-_+v  2 (7)
Combining  (6) with (7) provides:
E  [dpd/d]=rE  [p]+Er[r  ]  V  a,  for  x5,y>0  (8) E 1 ~j-r  iPJ'~1'XI  2  xx  (8
Equation  (8) is a generalization  of price-arbitrage  conditions  given  in cost-of-carry  models  such  as
Williams  and Wright  (1991,  p. 27). The arbitrage  condition  states  that the expected  change  in price  will be
equal to  rEip) -- interest on investing the money elsewhere -- plus C. -- the costs of physical storage and
any amenity  from storage  -- minus i V,  a  . If V.,, is positive,  then this last term constitutes  a dispersion
premium  that increases  with the variability  of the stochastic  component  of inventories 2. The last two
components  of (8) have  important  implications  for holding  inventories  in the face of less-than-full  carrying
charges. According  to the condition,  it still may  be optimal  to hold inventories  when  the market  is in
backwardation -- E[dpIdt]  < 0 -- if inventories provide a cost-reducing Kaldor-convenience (that is, if C 1
is sufficiently  negative)  and/or  the dispersion  premium,  i v. cr, is sufficiently  positive. The  two
components  are  not mutually  dependent. Kaldor-convenience  alone  can potentially  explain  inventory-
holding  in backward  markets,  as can a dispersion  premium. When Vm = 0 and C, is positive,  (8) can be
intrepreted  either as the cost-of-carry  arbitrage  condition  from the literature  on inventories,  or as the
Hotelling  Principle  without  extraction  costs.8
Two of the results  of the model  can be used to derive  an econometric  estimate  of the dispersion
premium. Combining  i) and ii) from (4) states  that expected  price is equal  to marginal  cost:
E(p)=  (C  Y))
This result  along  with the price-arbitrage  equation  (8), are given  functional  form to derive  empirical  results.
To implement  the model  of crude  oil prices  and inventories  given  by equations  (8) and (9), we
approximate  the cost function  with a third order  quadratic  function:
5  5  5  5  5  5
C=L+) oX  +jXDjXiXj  + ,  XIXJXk  (10)
i=l  e.,  j=l  i=1  j=I  k=I
where  X  =  wages, w,
X2  =  field production of crude oil, y,
X3  =  month  ending  private  stocks  of crude  oil, x,
X4  =  oil wells drilled, k, and
X5  =  technical change index, z.
We assume  symmetry  in Pi and Ygk.  In addition  to production  and ending  inventories,  we assume  the cost
function  depends  upon wage rates,  production  capacity,  and technical  change. This function  represents  the
cost of producing,  transporting,  and delivering  crude  oil to the wholesale  market,  where  the buyers  are
crude  oil traders  and refiners. We assume  that production  and inventories  jointly determine  costs.  Due  to
data unavailability,  drilling  activity  is used as a proxy  for production  capacity  because  drilling  typically
increases  sharply  as production  capacity  limits  are approached.  Likewise,  we must use a proxy  for
technical  change. Since  the late 1980s  there  have  been  major  advances  in oil exploration  and development,
including  seismic  imaging,  automatic  positioning  of rigs in deep water,  and horizontal  drilling. As a result,
the efficiency  of oil and gas production  has increased  substantially.  The only readily  available  proxy  for
these  changes  is the success  rate in drilling  measured  by the ratio of discoveries  per well drilled,  which
serves  as our proxy for technical  change,  z.
The third order  cost function  implies  that marginal  cost, C,, and the partial  derivative  of cost with
respect  to inventories,  C., are quadratic  functions:
Dc  5  5  5
a  a  + X  Py  Xj  + XQ,  Y  Xj  Y  4,kX  i  =  ,x
axi  J=l  j=I  k=l9
Our  cost function  implies  that the third  order  derivatives  in the dispersion  premium  are parameters.  The
expected  marginal  cost  equation  takes  the following  form:
P =  + 0,.w+  p,y++  Pyx + Ikk+  PI,z
+(Y 2) y  w2  + y.,, wy  + yx wx  +y,,  wk + y  vz
+(Y2) y,  y2 + y  YX  +y iyk yk+Y,  yz
+(Y 2) 'yx  X2 +  yk xk+ y ,  xz
+(Y 2) yy  kk +y  kk+(Y2)y  z2,  (12)
where  we have  replaced  the numbered  subscripts  with letters  used in (3) above. The estimating  equation
for the arbitrage  relation  is as follows:
pf-p-rp=at  +Pf.  w+par y+p.  x+pxt  k+p,  z
+(y2)  -y"W W  2+Y  KY  vY+ywXr  wx+y.x  wk+  +  1t  Wz
+(y2).Y.  y2 + -y'  yx+yk  yk+y  yz
+(/ 2)Y.  x2 +yk  xk + y,,  xz
+(Y2)y  k2 +  kZ+(Y 2) ye  Z 2
-(Y2)  y)(Y)2  + 2'y  Y,  hdxdyx  f  2]  (13)
Using  results  from Cootner  (1964)  and Merton  (1992),  Larson  (1993)  shows  that the volatility  of
inventories  can be expressed  in terms  of the associated  price volatility.  We,  therefore,  use implied  price
volatility  from the  crude  oil options  market  for as  t..  We  use the difference  between  the 4 week forward
price and the spot price  for the expected  price  change  in (6).
We  append  random  error terms  to (5)  and (6) to represent  expectational  errors and estimate  the two
equations  as a system  using  the Generalized  Method  of Moments  (GMM)  estimator. The GMM  estimator
is potentially  superior  to conventional  instrumental  variable  estimators,  yielding  consistent  and efficient
estimators  when  past or future  values  of the instruments  are corTelated  with the error terms. Our sample
period  starts  in February 1989  and ends  in June 1994. The  petroleum  production,  sales,  and inventory  data
are from the Energy  Information  Administration. Spot  and forward  prices  are collected  from Petroleum  &
Energy  Intelligence  Weekly,  Inc. Implied  price volatility  is from the Commodity  Research  Bureau.
The information  set available  to the oil market  provides  a basis for selecting  instrumental  variables.
The instruments  include  lagged  variables  from the  model,  including  spot and forward  prices,  wages,10
production,  stocks,  technical  change,  short  term interest  rates,  drilling  activity,  and volatility. We
supplement  this list with demand  shock  instruments  that include  heating  and cooling  degree  days  and
lagged,  seasonally  unadjusted  values  for the Standard  and Poor  500 stock  price index,  housing  starts,  and
industrial  production.  We also include  dummy  variables  for  fixed monthly  effects,  the Exxon  Valdez
tanker  accident,  the invasion  of Kuwait  in August  1990,  "Desert  Shield"  from September  through
December  1990,  and for "Desert  Storm"  during  January  and February  1991. These  last three dummy
variables  represent  the impact  of political  events  on expectations  in the oil market. All continuous
variables  are normalized  except prices  and the returns  to storage  to avoid  scaling  problems  in estimating  the
model  and in calculating  elasticities.
V. Econometric  Results
We first test the  maintained  restrictions  of the model,  such  as dynamic  optimization  and the
quadratic  approximation  of the cost function. The value  of the objective  function  for the GMM  estimator  is
distributed  as a Chi-squared  statistic  with  degrees  of freedom  in this study  equal to the 30 instruments  times
2 equations  minus the 36 parameters.  The value  of the objective  function  is 13.4,  which is less than the
critical  value  of 36.45  at the 5 percent  level of significance  with 24 degrees  of freedom. Consequently,  we
cannot  reject  the over-identifying  restrictions  of the model. The  fit of the two equations  is reasonably  good
with  the R2 coefficient  0.55 for marginal  cost and 0.53 for the returns  to storage  equation. The estimated
residuals  do not have  a unit  root, which  suggests  the  absence  of serious  dynamic  mis-specification.
In Table 2, we present  the parameter  estimates. The  first order effects  of wages,  production,
drilling,  and technical  change  are significant  in the marginal  cost  equation. The "own"  second-order
coefficients  for wages,  inventories,  drilling,  and technical  change  in the marginal  cost equation  are also
significant.  Seven interaction  parameters  are also significant  in the marginal  cost  equation:  wages  -
production,  drilling  with production  and wages,  and technical  change  with wages,  production,  inventories
and drilling. The first order effects  for stocks,  wages,  and technical  change  in the returns  to storage
equation  are significant.  Like marginal  cost, the parameters  on squared  wages,  stocks,  drilling  and
technical  change  in the returns  to storage  relation  are significant.  Three  second-order  effects  in  C,  are
significant:  wages  with drilling  and technical  change,  and drilling  with technical  change. The  dispersion
term is a function  of three  parameters, Y,,,,,  .Y,, . The last  parameter,  'Yyxx,  is significantly  positive
and when  multiplied  by implied  volatility  is large  enough  so that the dispersion  premium  is also  positive.11
Table  2: Parameter  Estimates
Parameter  F.stinmate t S1tafistic  Parameter  Fctimate  t !Rtatistic.
a.,  -3311.53  -3.95  'Y,,1,%  -86.14  -3.11
2557.83  3.86  Yvvkz  -86.33  -3.91
kv  2472.79  2.67  Y,zz  -96.97  -4.14
p^,x  -258.13  -1.01  aX  240.05  1.14
Pvk  1098.17  5.01  owx  -280.06  -1.84
IV7  728.93  3.67  IYY  175.76  2.32
'Ywv  -1303.71  -4.38  Ok  -25.08  -0.75
Y,VV  ,\,  -844.02  -1.71  j3,,  -73.85  -2.56
l^, . 158.30  1.63  y . 121.22  2.50
Y,^,,,,  -424.78  -5.50  YW,.  -56.51  -1.38
Y,,,,,  -158.09  -2.04  8k  29.51  2.72
'y  ,\,,  -683.01  -1.33  'Y%VX7  25.17  1.91
Y ,-.,  39.15  0.24  y  -82.09  -2.04
'Y  wvk  -486.13  -3.48  Yx  -19.94  -1.33
SY  wz  -418.78  -3.07  x,z  -11.34  -1.50
Rye  vx1.08  3.50  ,Y  14.75  2.76
'Y  vxk  -5.50  -0.26  Y  xkz  5.67  2.06
'Y  vxz  44.33  2.22  1 xzz  8.70  2.79
The model  has variable  elasticities  of marginal  cost and of returns  to storage,  which  are presented
in Table  3.  Since  the  benefits  of stock holding  can be negative,  we do not divide  these  elasticities  by
predicted  C.,. Instead,  we multiply  the derivatives  by the level  of the variable  in the partial  equilibrium
differentiation.
Table 3: Elasticities  and Scaled  Derivatives
Marginal  Cost, Cy  Elasticities  "t" Ratios
Wages  0.22  0.36
Production  -1.10  -1.10
Inventories  -0.44  -2.84
Drilling  0.16  1.00
Technical  Change  -0.55  -3.22
Stock/Cost  Benefit, Cx  Scaled  Derivatives  "t' Ratios
Wages  -1.03  -0.62
Production  -8.81  -2.84
Inventories  5.33  2.93
Drilling  0.09  0.19
Technical  Change  0.19  0.35
The inventory  elasticity  of marginal  cost is -0.44 with a relatively  high "t" statistic  suggesting  that
marginal  costs shift up (down)  with  lower (higher)  inventories.  This finding  in conjunction  with our
positive  and significant  estimate  for 'Yyx.  suggests  that the  dispersion  premium  arises  because  marginal  cost
decreases  (increases)  with higher  (lower)  inventories  at an increasing  rate. We also find that recent12
advances  in drilling  and exploration  technology  have  significantly  reduced  marginal  cost. Our  negative
production  elasticity  of marginal  cost suggests  increasing  returns  but its relatively  low t statistic  suggests
that  this may not be significant.
The scaled  derivative  of the estimated  C 1 function  with  respect  to inventory  levels  is positive  and
significant,  consistent  with the theory  of storage. The predicted  values  of C,:  are plotted  against  inventory
levels  in Figure 5. The graph  illustrates  that at low inventory  levels,  the cost reducing  effect  of holding
inventory  is large  and at high stock levels C, is positive  indicating  that costs actually  rise with additional
stocks. We also find that the C, function  shifts  up (down)  with lower (higher)  production.  The C 1
function  does  not seem  to be significantly  affected  by wages,  drilling,  or technical  change. Overall,  our
estimates  reveal  that at least a portion  of the returns  to storage  reflects  the cost-reducing  benefits  from
holding  stocks.
The dispersion  premium,  which  constitutes  the other  portion  of the retums  to storage,  is plotted
below  in Figure  6. We  express  the dispersion  premium  as a percent  of the crude  oil spot price  at an annual
rate. Our estimate  is on average  nearly  40 percent  with a standard  deviation  of almost 18 percent. Notice
in Figure  6 that the premium  reached  over 100  percent  at the height  of the Gulf  War  crisis and fluctuates
considerably.  This uncertainty  premium  may help  explain  the gap discovered  by Adelman  and Watkins
(1995)  between  transactions  prices  for oil and gas properties  and prices  implied  by the Hotelling  Valuation
Principle.
These  dispersion  premium  may vary  with political,  economic,  and geophysical  uncertainties.  To
assess  this possibility,  we  estimate  the same  model  for crude  oil sold  in the United  Kingdom,  Dubai,
Malaysia,  and Indonesia. Due  to data limitations  we  only estimate  the intercept  terms, t,,  and CX,  and YKy.
in equations  (5) and (6) and assume  the remaining  parameters  for C,. and C, are the same  as those
estimated  above. The forward  prices  for Malaysian  Tapis  and Indonesia  Minas-34  are unavailable. As a
proxy,  we use the forward  price  for the Dubai  Fateh  (DF) crude  since  both crudes  are traded in Asia.
We find the dispersion  premium  for U. K. Brent  oil nearly  identical  with  West  Texas  Intermediate
while  those for Dubai,  Malaysia,  and Indonesia  are somewhat  lower. All premiums,  however,  are
substantial,  suggesting  that a significant  dispersion  premium  exists for crude  oil assets. As a result,  we
conclude  that, for the countries  examined  here,  country  risk is not a factor  in explaining  the premium  in oil
inventory  pricing.  6
6 Using  a different  time  period  and  different  methodology,  Gibson  and Schwartz  (1990)  also  found  evidence  of a
premnium  related  to the  stochastic  component  of petroleum  price  movements.  However  for  their  study,  the
premium  ranged  lower, averaging  around  4.5%.13
Table 4: Estimated  Dispersion  Premiums  for Various  Crude Oils
Annual  Percent
Moan  Standard  Deviation
West  Texas Intermediate  Crude  39.81  17.78
Dubai Fateh  Prompt  37.56  17.28
UK Brent-38  b  40.71  17.30
Malaysia  Tapis  25.37  11.67
Indonesia  Minas-34  27.16  12.51
VI. Conclusions
This paper  provides  a theoretically  consistent  empirical  model  of the convenience  yield. Using  a
stochastic  control  formulation,  we show how  production  and inventories  are related  to spot  and forward
prices  for crude  oil. Our results  show  that apparent  losses  from holding  crude  oil stocks  are offset  by the
benefits  derived  from inventories  and by a significant  dispersion  premium  that rises sharply  during  market
disruptions.  This finding  is consistent  with  the lack  of empirical  support  for Hotelling-based  theories  of
natural  resources  pricing. Moreover,  our results  suggest  that current  methods  of pricing  reserves  and
related  assets  significantly  undervalue  those assets. Further,  this result  holds  across several  markets  for
petroleum  differentiated  by location  and  type of crude.
Evaluating  an investment  in an oil  project  involves  a daunting  array  of unknowns. Traditional
discounted  cash flow  analysis  projects  a stream  of discounted  net revenues.  Petroleum  engineering
relations  provide  a basis  for projecting  expected  production  levels  with a reasonable  degree of accuracy.
Crude  oil prices,  however,  are much  more  difficult  to predict. Frequently,  available  future  prices  are used
to a point  and some version  of the Hotelling  Principle  is used  to value  more  distant  production.  The
practical  consequence  is that oil reserves  are undervalued  since  such  methods  ignore  the dispersion  premia
and Kaldor-convenience  effects  which  jointly  determine  the observed  term structure  for forward  and future
prices.
Further  research  could  reveal  the robustness  of this estimate. Our preliminary  analysis  yields
plausible  dispersion  premia,  but more  complete  information  is needed. A cross  sectional  time series
analysis  for several  oil producing  countries  could  be useful. Finally,  an examination  of the demand  for
inventories  could  result  in more  efficient  estimates.million barrels  Dollars pcr barrel
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